Various web links I found to be of interest recently:
To obtain a balanced view of pharmaceutical progress (or lack thereof), we need to step back, define a few terms and concepts, and make explicit certain assumptions.
There is also no doubt that some companies have flagrantly covered up
negative data. In some cases, after being "caught" the companies
paid hundreds of millions of dollars in fines or, in one recent case,
settled with harmed patients for $5 billion (Singer 2009).
Almost everyone outside the industry feels an excessive amount of
money is spent on misleading advertising--especially for drugs
like those in table 5 that would not sell themselves. Also,
the use of ghost writers and excessive payments to thought leaders,
florid conflicts of interest, and payments to practicing physicians
to encourage specific drug use clearly occur (see table 1). These
practices should be outlawed (Stein-brook 2009).
Finally, scientifically worthless seeding studies (i.e., studies that
do not test a hypothesis but are meant to familiarize physicians
with the drug with the intent of increasing sales) may be on the
wane, as is publishing only positive data and encouraging biased
talks and literature. The press, academicians, journals, and public
have wisely cracked down and lampooned such practices endlessly.
However, I submit that incredible good has been done by the drugs and
vaccines in tables 3 and 4 (and many others not mentioned because of
space limitations, like erythropoetin for certain types of anemia).
See the full article for more of the positives (based on facts). Overall, I think a good skeptical nuanced analysis.
"These results do not allow us to make any judgment regarding
possible levels of risk at levels of exposure typical for water
fluoridation in the U.S. On the other hand, neither can it be
concluded that no risk is present."
Which is the problem with all of these issues:
you can never prove a negative.
And that opens the door for truthiness with numbers. Scienciness.
In some large part, science is powerful not because of ideas
but because of how it treats ideas. Science asks, prove it.
The distinction is what separates science from philosophy:
falsifiable claims and experimentation.
. . .
String theory and the multiverse are concepts that by definition
defy experimentation, and yet a small movement within cosmology
is attempting to make the case that they should be exempt.
At stake, according to Ellis and Silk, is the integrity of science itself.
. . .
The scientific high-ground is at stake, with an ocean of
pseudoscientists ready to flood the landscape, taking the public
with them. The answer, according to th
current paper,
lies in a
simple question. What observational or experimental evidence is
there that would convince a theorist that their theory is wrong? If
there is none, then the theory is not a scientific theory.
In order to recognize wrongness, scientists must maintain some level
of detachment from their cherished theories and be open to the ideas
of others in their respective fields.
... Wrongness is something we all secretly or openly dread.
According to self-described
"Wrongologist" Kathryn Schulz,
in the abstract, we all understand that we're fallible
but on the personal level, we leave little to no room for being wrong.
How to find out anything from anyone
Hundreds of studies have shown that interrogators would be just as well off flipping a coin
Ginsberg's book is a direct challenge to the optimism of the celebrated cognitive neuroscientist Steven Pinker, whose 2011 book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, argued that violence is playing a diminishing role in human affairs. Ginsberg counters that violence is essential both to transformational change and to the preservation of political and social order.
Also see Ginsberg's article Why Violence Works in The Chronicle of Higher Education.Paper from Stanford University and Harvard Business School
When people seek to impress others, they often do so by highlighting individual achievements. Despite the intuitive appeal of this strategy, we demonstrate that people often prefer potential rather than achievement when evaluating others. Indeed, compared with references to achievement (e.g., "this person has won an award for his work"), references to potential (e.g., "this person could win an award for his work") appear to stimulate greater interest and processing, which can translate into more favorable reactions. This tendency creates a phenomenon whereby the potential to be good at something can be preferred over actually being good at that very same thing. We document this preference for potential in laboratory and field experiments, using targets ranging from athletes to comedians to graduate school applicants and measures ranging from salary allocations to online ad clicks to admission decisions.